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This thesis responds to the questions "With the empirical, 'found' world prevalent as the 
paradigm for all valid knowledge, what happened to the relevance of the human in knowledge? 
Is there an alternative that does not divorce the knower from the knowing?" The ideas of 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Michel Foucault (1926-1984), two thinkers traditionally 
viewed as rivals in continental philosophy and social theory, animate these questions. Both 
philosophers critique the taken-for-granted aspects of the world: Husserl through the constituting 
subject and Foucault through the socially, linguistically, and historically constituted subject. 
Rather than an either-or that oversimplifies the subject, a dialogue and a symbiosis between these 
two thinkers point to the foundation of an active, meaning-endowing subject in which this 
subject is enmeshed in intersubjective power relations and in which certain knowledges are 
subjugated to others. Through a combined critique, it is possible to continue an investigation 
beyond a discursive level, to desediment more layers ofknowledge, and to continue to critique 
the always-already there in order to understand enduring constitutions and the subject's 
becoming. 
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Scientia et Sapaentia Knowledge and Wisdom. The herald ofintellectual inquiry that 
presides over Illinois Wesleyan. In the spirit ofthis intellectual tradition, I continue: 
We have learned and continue to learn great things from the methods we have used and 
continue to use in sociology. From controversial studies such as Laud Humphreys's Tearoom 
Trade] to the less notorious studies such as Stewart Lockie et al's study on organic food 
consumption,2 our sociological methodology has taught us a great deal about social interaction, 
socialization, social norms, and other social factors. But something is missing. That something? 
A focus on the concrete subject qua subject qua agent qua human being. Perhaps this missing 
piece is due to the fact that we have gone about studying social interaction in a way that relies 
heavily on the notion of a "found" world with certain empirical rules, a notion that divorces the 
knower from the knowing. In an academic setting in which empirical methods of statistical facts 
and natural laws and a belief in the existence of a "found" world (in a word, positivism) govern, 
not just in sociology, but also in the general way in which academia is "done," I find myself 
asking: What happened to the relevance of the human in knowledge and wisdom? Is there an 
alternative to positivism in presenting a critique? A critique that does not rely on a strategy that 
uncritically posits positive, objective, "found" knowledge as the paradigm for all valid 
knowledge? And what might we find ifwe turn back to the human, the agent, the subject? 
This thesis is my response to the above questions, questions that a rivalry in social theory 
and continental philosophy animates: that between the ideas ofEdmund Husserl and Michel 
Foucault. Both Husserl and Foucault critique the taken-for-granted aspects of the world around 
] Laud Humphrey. Tearoom Trade: Impersonal Sex in Public Places. 1970. 
2 Lockie, Stewart, et al. "Eating 'Green': Motivations Behind Organic Food Consumption in 
Australia." 2002. 
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us and what we perceive as always-already there: Husserl through the constituting subject and 
Foucault through the socially, linguistically, and historically constituted discursive subject? 
Differing versions of the subject in Foucauldian post-structuralism and in Husserlian 
transcendental phenomenology are, however, traditionally viewed as opposing each other-the 
subject is either one or the other.4 This rivalry, however, rests on an oversimplification of the 
subject that singularizes, compartmentalizes, and restricts the plurality of the subject's world.5 It 
does not allow for the complexity of what it means for the human to be in the world, of the 
world, and experiencing and knowing the world. In response to this simplification, I move for a 
new sociological methodology: a move for a return to human that focuses on the subject's 
3 Another possible way of explaining this concept of constituted subject is Zach Summers's term 
being-in-society (93), an extension ofSartre's being in relation to others which emphasizes how 
this being is given its meaning through the governing structures and rules of the social body. 
Similarly, Martin Jay in Downcast Eyes provides an explanation of the role of the gaze in 
constituting the subject: "The non-reciprocity between the look and the eye, between being the 
subject and the object of the gaze, is in fact related to a fundamental struggle for power. For the 
one who casts the look is always subject and the one who is its target is always turned into an 
object... self is constituted by the gaze of the other: 'L'autre me voit, donc je suis' [The other 
sees me, therefore lam]" (288). While these examples expand more on the concept of 
constituted subject, I contend, as Summers does in his project of grounded ethics, that these 
Sartrean notions need a Foucauldian understanding of sociopolitical relations to further explain 
the relationships between the subject and other~ (emphasis on plurality of others) rather than just 
the Other (singular). 
4 William Schroeder, p 621-622; Serge Valdinoci, p. 73 and 100; Bernard Charles Flynn, p. 228. 
5 Perhaps one of the clearest examples of rigidity in constituting versus constituted subject is that 
of identity. For the constituting subject, an individual only knows within the scope of his or her 
race, sex, culture, etc. and can only extend that knowledge politically within that particular 
realm. This argument for a constituting subject in identity is detrimental in that it leads to the 
categorizing and compartmentalization of who can and cannot know and, thus, who can or 
cannot "legitimately" act. For example, only women can understand sexism and thus are the only 
ones who know enough to battle sexism. OR, for the constituted subject, an individual only 
knows because s/he is given and formed within a certain sociopolitical framework from which to 
work. For example, the fact of my woman-ness and what I am permitted to do as woman comes 
from a discursive struggle over a gender binary as well as what is deemed natural or unnatural 
for me to do. This constituted subject in identity is detrimental in that in leads to a resignation to 
linguistic and cultural relativism. The opposition within the inquiry into identity is causal and 
unambiguous. There is a defmitive end and a defmitive beginning point. 
2 
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agency while not forgetting the sociopolitical forces at play. While Henry Rubin6 and David 
Fryer7 also contend that phenomenology and post-structuralism are compatible, I will use the 
conflict between phenomenology and post-structuralism to pose a new method ofunderstanding 
the subject. Widening and furthering their projects, not resolving one thinker into the other, 
produces a new methodology that seeks to put the agency back into the human while allowing 
for social and historical factors that affect her constituting. This new methodology is a return to 
the self that underscores the importance of the individual agency and that does not deny the 
demands, structures, and relations of the world around. It is an acknowledgement of the 
complexity of the world, a complexity beyond wildest imagination and a focus on how we are 
concretely in the world. A symbiosis that retains Foucault's and Husserl's dynamism, this new 
methodology ofbecoming takes into account the formation of a subject while not divorcing the 
knower from the knowing. 
Husserlian Transcendental Phenomenology: Awayfrom Nai've Objectivism, Toward 
Transcendental Subjectivity and Intended Consciousness 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) was a German mathematician and philosopher whose 
project focused on bringing what is implicit and viewed as common sense in the world to a 
reflective place. Husserl's The Crisis ojEuropean Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology 
(1936) continues from Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology (1931). In 
6 Rubin compares Sartre and Foucault to claim that phenomenology and post-structuralism are 
compatible, but his explanation of Sartre's levels ofbodily ontology to understand trans­
gendered identities is more akin to Husserl's constituting, meaning-endowing subject, and hence 
the reason for using Husserl rather than Sartre in my comparison. 
7 While Fryer ("Toward a Phenomenology ofGender...") uses Foucault and Husserl together to 
push for a Husserlian methodology ofgender, I will expand Foucault and Husserl in relation to 
the subject in general rather than Foucault and Husser1 in relation to sex and gender. 
3 
both of these books, Husserl describes his project of transcendental phenomenology as a 
response to science's unquestioned reliance on positivistic proof and belief in uncovering the so-
called truth through uncovering the supposedly independently existing objective world. This type 
of phenomenology focuses on the transcendental conditions that underlie human experience, 
including the experience of worldliness itself and what makes experience possible. 
The transcendental condition is consciousness. This consciousness is not the opposite of 
subconsciousness or ofunconsciousness. Consciousness is the source for phenomena and for our 
making sense of the world, of giving it shape and meaning-in whatever shape it takes and in 
whatever way we go about it.8 Husserl states, "[W]e are subjects for this world... experiencing it, 
contemplating it, valuing it, related to it purposefully; for us this surrounding world has only the 
ontic meaning given to it by our experiencings, our thoughts, our valuations, etc.,,9 In simplest 
terms, what we know of the world and of world-ness, we know from our experience ojthe world. 
Through the voluntary philosophical stance called the phenomenological reduction- or 
epoche-- the phenomenologist10 arrives at this transcendental level of experience. In the epoche, 
the individual brackets what she knows, recognizing the possibility of its not being known. 11 In 
enacting the epoche, she calls into question what had been simply accepted as obvious-
materiality, causation, value, meaning for others, etc.-in order to shake up stuck, rigid 
8 Thus, the Surrealist questions of what is reality and what do we really see, influences from the
 
Freudian push for the validity ofdreams and the unconscious, are not discredited here, but are
 
opened up as very real possibilities for meaning-endowing consciousness.
 
9Husserl, The Crisis ojEuropean Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Crisis), p. 105,
 
sic.
 
10 The phenomenologist is any individual enacting the epoche in his/her inquiry.
 
11 This reduction is not an easily summarized mental technique in which one can follow steps 1-5
 
and tah-dah! end up at an immediate outcome. Rather, it is a process that requires continuous
 
reflection.
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sediments ofknowledges and to expose an individual's uninterrogated accepted claims. 12 From 
this bracketing, the world as world and its phenomena as intentional correlates oftranscendental 
subjectivity become evident. Phenomena are revealed as meant objects; that is, phenomena are 
recognized as signified as object by a subject, as a particular object with a specific meaning as 
well as a specific manner in which the object is presented by consciousness. Objects are not 
things outside ofa subject, her consciousness, constituting them as such. 
This constitution is not static. The essence~ of an object or ofphenomena are aspects or 
qualities ofan object as intended. A comment on essence is not a statement on what is an 
original or inherent, fixed or metaphysical content of the object that can be uncovered. It is 
instead an acknowledgement ofthe malleability ofhow objects are constituted and the 
possibilities of the thing's coming to be as meant: its becoming. 
While there are these possibilities ofour constitution of world-as-world and objects in the 
world, the essences establish certain conditions for the world. Constitution of the world builds 
meaning and establishes and organizes meaning in particular ways. For example, we constitute 
the world as temporal and spatial. We also distinguish ourselves from others, my ego from your 
ego, based on personal space, internal time consciousness, and external points of reference. That 
is, there is a sense ofown-ness, a sense of"what is specifically peculiar to me as ego, my 
concrete being as a monad, purely in myself and for myself," 13 that helps me distinguish me 
from you. Yet we experience the world as an intersubjective world, a world in which we are 
12 In the epoche, the world is no longer viewed on a straightforward basis. However, as Maurice
 
Natanson reminds us, "reflecting and living continue, side by side in the life of consciousness"
 
(Natanson 59). The epoche is not a denial or forgetting ofthe world surrounding the individual
 
performing the epoche; the phenomenologist remains in the world as much as ever and does not
 
separate her self from herself.
 
13 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 94, my emphasis.
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aware ofothers14 experiencing the world and others experiencing us. While others are objects for 
me in the world, they are also subjects for the world, that is, egos intending the world-as-world 
and the objects in it. This awareness ofothers constituting the world is a recognition ofa 
"community ofmonads," ofme as monad and others as monads intending the world. 15 With this 
acknowledgement of the universalityl6 of constitution and intended consciousness, there is also 
an acknowledgement of an intersubjective constitution ofan object: what exists for me, also 
exists for you. We constitute more than just the existence ofobjects. We also constitute objects 
as having multiple sides that change shape based on our vantage point of the object; these 
retentive and protentive horizons, the approach and recession of objects based on a change in 
time and vantage point, come with our encounter with the world-as-world. A subject's 
recognition of ownness, intersubjectivity, protentive and retentive horizons, and a space-time 
dimension points to an intentional process that is not chaotic. 17 There are certain invariant 
structures ofthe life-world, then, that we use to make sense ofthe world of objects; we cannot 
choose as if we could constitute otherwise. 
In ''whatever way we may be conscious ofthe world," our consciousness is directed. 18 
Husserl refers to this directedness as intentionality.19,20 Perceptions point to something, 
regardless ofhow, why or what they point to. Thinking is always thinking of something. Willing 
is a willing of something. Imagining is imagining something. Dreaming is dreaming of 
14 That is, other than me, alien to me, not-me. 
IS Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 107. 
16 This universality is not a metaphysical claim. It is, instead, part of the explanation of the 
intentional components implicit in the experienced and experiential world that exists for us. 
17 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 54 
18 Husserl, Crisis, p.l08. 
19 This intension is not a statement on motivation for action, but a statement on action having a
 
correlate, a target.
 
20 Husserl refers to this intended object and intended world as noema and the intentional act as
 
noesis. The noesis is understood in its active relation to the noema.
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something. The way in which we know that the world is real is by intending it as real. The notion 
of our intending consciousness underscores that an individual is action: a dynamic force that 
gives objects their object-ness and makes sense of the world as world and of its phenomena. As 
Husserl states, "[I]t is to this or that object that we pay attention, according to our interest; with 
them we deal actively in different ways; through our acts they are 'thematic' objects.',2l These 
objects have a meaning because we intend them as such; they are meant objects. 
This intended-meaning radically breaks with the prejudices of the so-called objective 
sciences. Positive science's understanding ofthe world comes from the notion that the world is 
there, with its natural laws and uniform ways of behaving that are waiting to be uncovered and, 
once discovered, easily predicted. This beliefof the world-as-found emphasizes the world's a 
priori existence, an existence outside of the individual, the discoverer, as well as the selfs 
passive receptivity to this already existing world. Husserl calls this belief in the underlying 
persistence ofthe world distinct from consciousness the natural attitude?2 
Transcendental consciousness calls into question the natural attitude and its unexpressed 
presupposition of the surrounding world as taken for granted as valid and as existing before and 
outside of the individual. As Husserl contends, "[T]he objective-scientific method rests upon a 
never questioned, deeply concealed subjective ground whose philosophical elucidation will for 
the first time reveal the true meaning of the accomplishments ofpositive science and, 
correlatively the true ontic meaning ofthe object world-precisely as a transcendental-subjective 
meaning.,,23 Thus, positivism is entrenched in naive objectivity.24 By naive, Husserl means that 
an individual relies unreflectively on an empirically real world. Facts and figures equal Truth. 
21 Husserl, Crisis, p. 108. 
22 Husserl, Crisis, p. 143. 
23 Husserl, Crisis, p. 100. 
24 Husserl, Crisis, p. 143. 
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Husserl's comment on the naIvete ofobjectivism is not a comment on objectivism's findings as 
right or wrong, but it is a statement that objectivism is misguided: objectivism overlooks itself as 
an achievement of intersubjective, intending consciousness. Husserl's view, however, is not anti-
science or a denial of the positive existence of the real. Rather, it is a challenge to how science is 
done. As Natanson notes, phenomenology does not "deny or relinquish the empirical but fastens 
on it as intentional object.,,25 Meaning of the world and its ability to be an a priori given comes 
from the ways in which the world has been intended. As Husserl describes it, objective science is 
"an accomplishment remaining within subjectivity.,,26 Objectivity from and for subjectivity: 
Objectivity is a product of the acting, intending individual. Its object-ness and the notion of 
unbiased neutrality in a positivistic approach comes from the subject intending it as object with 
said features and with said means of analysis. The phenomenological interest in the object is not 
an interest on its appearance or its realness, but it is an interest because ofwhat is intended and 
how consciousness constitutes. Rather than facts and figures of science's positivism, 
phenomenology offers a new foundation for inquiry and for objectivity. This "new ground" is the 
ground of a subject's intending and constituting consciousness?7 
Remember, though, one's consciousness is not an isolated consciousness. In recognizing 
intersubjectivity at the transcendental level and constitution of objects as there for everyone, 
there is a recognition of other individuals being in the world-as-world. Husserl's subjectivism is 
neither a solipsism nor a relativism. However, Husserl's project does not offer an explanation, 
however, of these intersubjective relations at a social or discursive level. Additionally, his 
exposition and critique of naIve objectivity remains only at either the transcendental or the broad 
25 Natanson, p. 185. 
26 Husserl, Crisis, p. 95. 
27 Husserl, Crisis, p. 100. 
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historical (e.g. Husserl's discussion of Galileo's mathematization of nature) level. While Husserl 
explains this history as a movement or as an evolution, the individual is not described in history 
nor in relation to the political nor with a concept ofpower or ofpolitics. 
Enter Foucault. Foucault's genealogical period offers an analysis of social and power 
relations that Husserl's transcendental phenomenology does not, an explanation that grounds 
individuals in the sociopolitical world and further reveals and destabilizes sedimented 
knowledges and that helps elucidate what to call into question about ourselves in the epoche. 
Foucauldian Post-Structuralism: Describing the Human in Relation to and Within 
Social Totalities 
Michel Foucault (1926-1984) was a French social historian and philosopher who 
interrogated what is taken for granted as known and, in the process, shakes up the present order 
ofevery day situations, scientific, linguistic, historic and academic frameworks of thought, and 
individuals' beliefs in these theories and concepts of how the world operates. Scholars 
traditionally divide his work into two periods: his archeological period and his genealogical 
period. In the first period, Foucault looked at the shifts in epistemes and what makes these shifts 
and knowledge possible, while in the latter he was occupied with lineage and development of 
these discourses in their relation to power and truth. There is also a third section in his later 
works that is less often focused on in secondary literature, but which I contend is highly 
significant: his tum to the active subject. 
9
 
Archaeology 
Foucault's archaeological period is a dig beneath the surface of everyday knowledge 
about how certain disciplines work.28 In his major archeological work, The Order o/Things 
(1966), Foucault describes his archaeological move as an inquiry into the conditions of 
knowledge, what makes knowledge possible, in order to understand the changes in epistemes­
systems ofknowledge or discourses on a particular topic. Tracking the evolutions in linguistics, 
economics, and biology, Foucault describes how discursive change is "an event in the order of 
knowledge.,,29 As these disciplines gain more knowledge about their particular topic, there are 
shifts in rules about ordering, logic, and representation that couple, uncouple, and re-couple 
different knowledges. Rather than a body ofknowledge, a seemingly smooth, continuous and 
''unified epistemological field" within the discipline, there are, Foucault says, many 
discontinuities- a movement in which interests were modified, shifted, and redistributed and 
different discursive regimes arose.30 These changes are "wrinkles traced for the first time upon 
the enlightened face of knowledge" in this archaeological dig.31 In the process of these breaks 
and reconnections of knowledge, these changes establish a hierarchy for what is more real, more 
necessary, and/or more true. This concentration on broad movements within disciplines in order 
to show discursive shifts and (re)ordering puts forth the notion: order within disciplines is open 
to change, and if change is "an event in the order ofknowledge," then knowledge is also open to 
change. Foucault's archaeological period, thus, focused on epistemes, not on the individual or 
28 This period traditionally includes his large works Madness and Civilization (1961), The Birth
 
o{the Clinic (1963), The Order o/Things (1966), and The Archaeology o/Knowledge (1969).
 
2 Foucault, The Order o/Things, p. 345.
 
30 Foucault, The Order o/Things, p. 246.
 
31 Foucault, The Order o/Things, p. 238.
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the specific dynamics within or between these epistemes, in order to show the uninterrogated 
disruptions in knowledge and order that make possible our knowledge of these disciplines. 
Genealogy: Discipline 
But what is the motivation for these discursive changes? Foucault addresses this question 
in his later works, in his genealogical period,32 while also continuing his archaeological inquiry 
into conditions for knowledge and discourse. Discourses are the foundation of society: society, 
objects and the idea of an individual are all subjected products of these discourses. As Foucault 
has already shown, they come into being through discourse, rather than preceding discourse. But 
there is more to just naming the multiplicity ofdiscourses. Foucault now realizes the 
impossibility ofneutrality within discourses and their functions is the catalyst for Foucault's 
genealogical shift. Foucault uses the creation and evolution ofspecific knowledge§ and 
rationalities to map and critique historical conflicts within discourses and to critique established 
authorities and knowledges. In this genealogical tum, Foucault establishes that there is a 
dynamic ofpower and will to truth that drives these knowledges and formations of discourse 
foundational to society. 
Rather than describing power as binaries of the ruler-ruled or ofoppressor-oppressed or 
affirming theories ofpower as jurisprudence, sovereignty, right, or economics, Foucault's 
analysis establishes power as a "complex strategical situation" in society.33 A web of 
interconnecting, fluid forces that go over-around-and-through society, power is everywhere. It is 
an immanent force "not because it embraces everything but because it comes from 
32 This period traditionally includes his large works, The Order ofDiscourse (1970), Discipline 
and Punish (1975) and The History ofSexuality, Volume 1 (1976). It also includes the interview 
"Truth and Power" that Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino conducted (1976). 
33 Foucault, The History ofSexuality, p. 93. 
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everywhere.,,34 To look for different centers ofpower is impossible. Power exists in relations, in 
its exercise. From this relational attribute of power, it becomes clear that there are necessary 
interactions between individuals. The infinite and minute interactions, social relations, are built 
up to form what we know as society. Power is rooted in this social nexus. But power is not an 
institutional structure or personal strength, nor can it be acquired or seized. Power does not result 
from the direct choice of the individual. Instead, power is a relational and productive force based 
on discursive definitions, definitions with their own aims and truths. Thus, power is not 
something that one "has" or "possesses." Rather, it is the name for a dynamic that occurs 
between and among agents, be they individuals, institutions, or states. 
One of the ways in which mechanisms of power function is by individuating subjects in 
immediate, everyday life. As Foucault writes, this form ofpower "categorizes the individual, 
marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on 
him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him.,,35 Power makes 
individuals subjects. It is also a form ofpower that has a link with a discursive truth about a 
subject and a discursive desire and motivation, a will, to need a truth. 
Foucault analyzes the Panopticon inDiscipline and Punish (1975) in order to illustrate 
how discursive practices operate and how power disciplines and shapes the individual. Replacing 
the previous techniques of torture and punishment, the Panopticon is a discipline structure, a 
prison structure with tiered, singular cells surrounding a central guard tower. In the Panopticon, 
the guard can see into the cells, but the prisoner cannot see into the tower. In this method, the 
34 Foucault, The History ofSexuality, p. 93. 
35 Foucault, "The Subject and Power," p. 781. While this quote crosses from the active 
subjectivity to the genealogical period ofhis works, it is an apt description ofhis genealogical 
description ofthe subject in relation to power. It also shows how genealogical imperatives 
continue in his move to active subjectivity. 
12 
crowd of inmates is easily numbered and categorized. As Foucault states, "Invisibility is a 
guarantee oforder',36: the permanent possibility ofbeing watched, ofbeing seen doing something 
slhe is not supposed to, keeps the prisoner's behavior in line. Slhe becomes the gaze, and in the 
process, slhe subjects hislherselfto this unverifiable control without direct force. Privileges are 
given for "good" behavior, a controlled conduct that conforms to the ideals of what a prisoner 
should be in hislher process ofreform to become a "functional" citizen. By internalizing what a 
"proper" citizen is, slhe disciplines hislherselfto a mode ofbehavior. No longer is the authority 
a single executioner on a public scaffold who inflicts bodily pain, but now the authority is an 
automated mechanism, which includes the individual, that restricts bodily movement while also 
prescribing a regimen for the non-corporal truths-drives, aptitudes, potentialities-of the 
person. In this way, the Panopticon enacts and enforces discipline-not only by disciplining the 
individual directly, but also by teaching the individual to discipline herself. 
Foucault's analysis of the Panopticon is not simply an analysis of the prison. It is also an 
analysis of the modem individual and the society that shapes her. The methods of the Panopticon 
filter into the modes of society and its lateral controls because ofthe inescapable, all-
encompassing discourses- a variety ofdisciplines, each with a unique know-how about the 
behavior and capacity that it assigns to an individua1.37 Within the discourses, Foucaul explains, 
"the formation of knowledge and the increase ofpower regularly reinforce one another in a 
circular process.,,38 Discourses create a rigid knowledge of the subject in categorizing and 
defining the topic ofdiscussion-the criteria of the supposed to be in how the topic is organized 
and the individual is identified. The subtle utilization ofknowledge about the individual codifies 
36 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 200.
 
37 While it is important to note that the Panoptic scheme is not the only way in which procedures
 
ofpower operate in society, it does explain productive power in social relations.
 
38 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 224.
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what is nonnal and natural. Discourses separate out the multiplicity, characterizing and 
classifying individuals around a discourse-defined truth, qualifying and ranking individuals on 
how close they fit the presupposed nonn. The more an individual confonns, the more s/he aligns 
with "his [or her] 'true' name, 'true' place.,,39 This sorting is permanent in that it is always 
present, but malleable in that its fonn changes from institution to institution and discourse to 
discourse. The institutions' central hub of ideals-their guard tower- are open to confonning 
individuals to inspect and to obtain a view from this point of inspection. Individuals presume that 
this access is democratically accessible rather than seeing the tyranny of this technique because 
of the process ofnonnalization. 
This nonnative process is a product of individuals unwittingly subjecting and disciplining 
themselves to different discursive ideals. The prospect of someone seeing him/her counter the 
prescribed notion, not the punishment itself, becomes the method of surveillance. This mode 
keeps an individual in compliance before s/he ever acts contrary to the nonn. Eventually, a code 
ofnonnalcy, a codified truth about the subject, develops; individuals have a standard to measure 
themselves against. Through comparison and nonnalization rather than punishment and law, this 
mode ofpower gains its authority. These discourse-detennined nonns are then believed to be 
natural for oneself and for others-their existence, evolution, and construction become invisible. 
This fonn of discipline is pervasive: it extends across modern society. As Foucault pointedly 
remarks, 
Is it surprising that the cellular prison, with its regular chronologies, forced labor, its 
authorities of surveillance and registration, its experts in nonnality, who continue and 
multiply the functions of the judge, should have become the modern instrument of 
penalty? Is it surprising that Frisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, 
which all resemble prisons?4 
39 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 198. 
40 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 227-228. 
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Genealogy: Power-Knowledge 
Recall that this pervasiveness is due to internalization of the nonn. This acceptance of the 
nonn as natural and already there subjects behavior-thought and action-to the nonn and gives 
power to this knowledge, fonning what Foucault calls the dyad "power-knowledge." In the 
power-knowledge dyad ofdiscourse, Foucault explains, "the speaking subject is also the subject 
ofthe statement.,,41 Slhe is the topic ofdiscussion and a particular discourse directs what slhe 
can or cannot say or do. There are certain prescriptive rules and discourse-defined truths in 
which she operates. Her subjectivity: Slhe is subjected to discourse as well as a subject of 
discourse. With the increase of discursive know-how and nonnalization, concepts of a topic 
become rigidified, stuck to a particular time, age, ethnicity, gender, class, etc. The construction 
of the nonn as well as the role ofknowledge and power relations are invisible. They are 
perceived as given, as already-there. Acting in accordance with these veiled ideals, individuals 
acquire another mode of subjection, another mode of subjectivity. 
This discursive making of subjects is a fonn, or technique, of power. Rather than a 
universal fonn or passive object that can be possessed or exchanged, power is a productive force 
that functions in multiple ways and in multiple relations between and among individual subjects, 
institutions, systems, and discourses. There is a mechanism ofpower that is located and 
produced through the minute and even mundane interrelations within society and woven into 
discourse. The exercise ofpower is rooted in this social nexus, not reconstituted above or outside 
of these systems and discourses. Power acts upon actions; this emphasis on the action in power 
means that there is a perpetual possibility of reversal. Discourses and techniques of power within 
them are malleable, not fixed. 
41 Foucault, The History ofSexuality, p. 61. 
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Discourses and the techniques ofpower within them are thus dynamic. As Foucault 
reminds us, "Relations ofpower-knowledge are not static forms ofdistribution.,,42 There is more 
than one objective in each strategy as well as more than one strategy in each objective. 
Regardless of technique or its dispersion, the strategy is not homogeneous on all social levels. 
For example, the discourse that proclaims sex as reproductive has different imperatives for race, 
class, gender, sexual orientation and age. 
In noting this multiplicity and dynamism, Foucault challenges a discourse's mentality of 
discovering a transcendental Truth and achieving Rationality. Instead, he asserts, there are many 
rationalities because there are many discourses and techniques within discourses. He contends 
that the word 'rationalization' is dangerous and what is needed is an analysis of "specific 
rationalities rather than always invoking the progress of rationalization in general.,,43 Because of 
power-truth interplay, certain knowledges have been lost, discredited, buried or rejected. Due to 
this subjected knowledge, there must be a focus on local, specific, and immediate knowledges 
and their infinite mechanisms ofpower and its effects. 
Foucault places the subject in relation to power. The individual is the most immediate site 
that power relations have their effect. Power relationships are rooted in the social nexus. This 
model ofpower centers itself on the individual and operates through an intricate interplay of 
power and truth. The analysis ofpower looks at how subjects are gradually constituted through 
discourse and the power-truth mechanisms within them. The individual is the subject to and of 
discourse, an effect ofpower. This productive power conceptualizes power as a force within 
social relations and a force predicated on knowledge of the subject, the formation of what it 
42 Foucault, The History a/Sexuality, p. 99 
43 Foucault, "The Subject and Power," p. 779-780. This quote is appropriate here in genealogy 
even ifit crosses the genealogical-subjectivity split ofFoucault's periods. 
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means to be a subject as well as being subjected to this knowledge. By focusing on the 
productions and techniques ofpower, it is apparent that the analysis ofpower "cannot take place 
simply at the level of ideological abstraction, but instead must view the concrete and myriad 
mechanisms through which power operates.,,44 Ideals are grounded in socially-created 
perceptions and their political push-pull. 
The genealogical period, then, focused on discipline and power-knowledge in order to 
show not only discursive shifts, like his archeological period's focus, but also the lack of 
neutrality in these shifts. Power is an underlying dynamic that arises from social interaction, a 
force that individuates and nonnalizes in order to discipline individuals and to teach individuals 
how to discipline themselves to certain discursively defined nonns. Through the increase of 
subjection ofthought and action to a particular nonn, power is given to this knowledge at the 
expense of other knowledges. 
Active Subjectivity 
You will recall that in his archeological period, Foucault's focus was on epistemes, while 
in the genealogical period his focus was on power, knowledge, and discourses. By the end of the 
genealogical period, however, Foucault finds himself talking more and more about the individual 
qua agent. There is a move within and after Foucault's genealogical work toward a focus on the 
individual's agency that addresses these questions: Who or what is enacting these power 
relations and putting discourse into action? Who or what is internalizing these nonns in order for 
them to become invisible and viewed as already-there? As Foucault "clarifies,,45 in "The Subject 
44 Summers, p. 26, my italics. 
45 But is it really a "clarification"? Or is he just back peddling to save his project? While I will 
leave this question to you as the reader to decide, I think it is important to note his adamant 
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and Power," the aim ofhis works is not discourse nor power, "but the subject which is the 
general theme" ofhis research.46 Foucault realizes that he reaches a barrier in genealogy because 
ofhis inattention to the subject qua agent. Rather than insisting on discourses as existing as 
separate entities apart from the subject, he reforms his genealogical critique to include 
individuals enacting and engaging in power relations and challenging discourses. The individual 
is no longer discourse's marionette. The active agent that does more than just passively receive 
these discourses, be a discursive subject, or be subjected to discourse by discourse. She has an 
active role-an active subjectivity.47 
In noting this always-present characteristic of discourses, Foucault claims that individuals 
can and need to challenge these discourses in order to mobilize a response to suffocating 
discourses. Instead ofunquestioningly aligning to a certain discourse, a "critical interrogation on 
the present and on ourselves" is possible.48 Awareness ofpower relations and discourses enables 
an individual to counter the authority that claims knowledge; to understand the historical 
struggles through which these power relations that constitute her individuality have come to 
exist; and to recognize her inter-enmeshment and function in power relations. Foucault 
challenges: Envision new ways ofbeing individuals. Individuals must call into question the very 
basic power relations that form the foundation of the social nexus and strive to analyze what is 
below the surface of everyday "rationality"-the motivations, the power struggles and the 
history of the local knowledge-while understanding that there is never "access to any complete 
aversion to the subject in his archaeological period and his introduction of the subject in his later
 
works and his insistence here in "The Subject ofPower" that the subject is and has always been
 
his main theme.
 
46 Foucault, "The Subject and Power," p. 778.
 
47 His large works The History ofSexuality, Vol. 2-3 (1984) and his later essays, including
 
"What is Enlightenment?," "The Subject and Power," "The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a
 
Practice of Freedom," and "Subjectivity and Truth" are included in this period.
 
48 Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" p. 132.
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or definite knowledge..." of an individual's capacities, hislher role in society, the social 
institutions, and the ultimate function of society.49 Individuals cannot know what type of 
situations will arise or when they will occur. No comprehensive cure-all can be guaranteed. An 
individual can only open her eyes as much as possible to the panopticism that surrounds her and 
push against her limits towards ''undefined work of freedom.,,50 In order to open up spaces for an 
unspecified, undefined freedom, slhe can only squirm to create twist-and-shout latitude within 
old discourses, taking each situation separately and realizing that what works today in a 
particular situation may not work tomorrow. Although discourses categorize the world, it is 
possible to challenge existing discourses and create spaces for personal liberation albeit still 
within a discourse and power relations. Discourses confine, but they also free. 
Foucault and Husserl: A Productive Crisis Towards a Complex, Active Subject 
Grounded in the Sociopolitical 
The Turn to the Active Subject 
While the subject tries to work to find latitude in discourses for her undefined work of 
freedom, Foucault's explanation ofthe subject in relation to the discursive power-knowledge­
truth trio gives the individual a passive dimension in which slhe receives an already-there 
discourse in which slhe is already enmeshed. As Beatrice Han explains, the Foucauldian analysis 
of subjectivity "appears to oscillate in a contradictory manner, between a definition of 
subjectivity as 'self-creation,' on the one hand, and on the other hand, the need, in order to 
understand the games of truth through which recognition itself operates, back to the practices of 
49 Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" p. 127. 
50 Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" p. 126. 
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power of which subjects are not masters and are usually not even aware.,,51 This tension points to 
a lack of foundation-while trying to historicize the subject in order to show that Husserl's 
transcendental intended consciousness was not so transcendental after all, Foucault fell back on 
an active subject. 
Foucault's tum to the active subject is important to note because of its large break with 
his previous writings and critiques ofphenomenology's subject. In his archeological work, 
Foucault critiques Hussed for being too transcendental and for trying to get to an a priori origin 
while also not recognizing phenomenology as a discourse. In The Order o/Things, Foucault 
writes that phenomenology raises "the ground of experience, the sense of being, the lived 
horizon of all our knowledge to the level ofour discourse.,,52 Phenomenology is unreflective 
about its discursive location, and it does not take into account its historical and political situation. 
Later on in his works, Foucault further critiques the notion of a constituting subject. As Foucault 
writes in one ofhis genealogical interviews, "Truth and Power" (1976): 
One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that's to 
say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a 
historical framework. And this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a form of history 
which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains ofobjects, 
etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in 
relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of 
history.53 
For Foucault, the idea of a constituting subject either separates the subject from historical 
political dimensions or neglects the many ways in which notions of the subject are discursively 
developed. 
51 Han, p. 172.
 
52 Foucault, The Order o/Things, p. 299.
 
53 Foucault, "Truth and Power," p. 117.
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Foucault, however, misreads the meaning oforigin, history, and constituting subject in 
Husserl. While the intended consciousness of the subject is a foundation, the origin for Husserl 
does not point to the genesis of History nor does it prescribe a fixed mode ofbeing or a specific 
prescriptive "supposed to" of doing, acting, or being for the subject. Intended consciousness, 
instead, describes how we make sense of the world, where all notions of even the world-as-world 
arise. Given the intended quality of consciousness there is not an "empty sameness"; there is 
always something that consciousness is directed towards, and it is not always the same 
something. Likewise, even though pointing to certain invariant structures in the life-world, 
constitution of a meant world is not static: it is a very dynamic process, a process in which an 
ego is continually making and giving sense to the world. This fashioning is a cultural and 
historical process but the subject is still the contributing agent. 54 Knowledge of the subject does 
not precede discourse. But the subject puts the discourse and its political dimensions in motion. 
Foucault's move to the active subject acknowledges that the subject is the mover and 
shaker in discourse. This shift, however, occurred at the end of his philosophical career. Soon 
after his turn to the active subject, he died, and there is not a clear indication of the direction that 
he would take this subject. While it is speculation that Foucault would eventually have moved to 
a more Husserlian phenomenology of the subject, his move to the subject does point to 
Foucault's realization that even if we are constituted, we do have a "why" in seeking an 
''undefined work of freedom." Otherwise, what point would there be to our focus on local 
struggles? There is a need for a subject who is acting and constituting subject rather than one 
who is simply constituted in understanding power, discourse, local knowledges, and making 
sense of the world. 
54 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 133. 
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Not only will an active subject offer insight into the ''undefined work of freedom" and an 
interrogation into local struggles, the active subject also prevents masking subjugated 
knowledges. In relying strictly on a constituted subject, Foucault hides subjugated knowledges 
he seeks to uncover. As Rubin asserts, Foucault undermines "the authority of individual speaking 
subjects and thereby plays into patterns of domination that work against the possibility of 
marginalized subjects using their knowledge of their own subject positions to speak counter­
discursively.,,55 Without a speaking subject, what is known about a certain topic or about a 
particular individual is generalized, subsumed in another discourse, and covered over again 
rather than being seen as its own genealogical layer. A focus on an active subject, even if it is 
perhaps not exactly the constituting subject that Husserl seeks, permits these submerged 
discourses to be voiced and dominant ones to be challenged-to continue Foucault's call to seek 
"the undefined work of freedom" and to focus on local knowledges. An active subject points to 
the subject as agent in power relations, discourse formations, and normalizing truths. 
A New Foundation: Turning to Husserl 
Although Foucault encourages an active subject in twist-and-shout lattitude in discourses 
and a genealogical approach to local knowledges, he does not give a new foundation. For 
Foucault, discourses are permanent- there is no escaping discourse. There is only moving 
through the discursive sludge to more discursive gunk. While Husserl does not try to simplify the 
mess, HusserI does provide a new foundation that does not fall into the trap ofblindly accepting 
the already-there that Foucault warns against. There is an acknowledgment that the new 
foundation does not have complete access to Knowledge and Wisdom. All knowledge is not to 
55 Rubin, p. 264. 
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be found in Husserl's writings alone, but Husserl does establish a methodological and analytic 
foundation that works in dialogue with other perspectives, 56 such as Foucault's. 
Rather than focusing on knowledge separate from the subject, phenomenology insists on 
the subject's primacy in the formation ofknowledge. It is concerned with how humans know the 
world, not for knowledge itself, but for knowing what the world means to us, the world as meant. 
Connecting knowledge to the knower, phenomenology inserts the human at the center of 
knowing. 
Focusing on the centrality of the subject, this new basis for inquiry also gives an 
alternative to positive objectivity: objectivity from and for subjectivity. Foucault, too, rejects a 
dogmatic belief in the value of scientific knowledge as the only way to acquire knowledge about 
something: he inverts the positivist approach that a definable, ultimate truth is possible or that it 
can be arrived at through an objective analysis. Rationality becomes rationalities. Knowledge 
becomes knowledges. He shows disciplines as lacking scientificity, as positively unscientific, but 
he does not critique science's positivism. As Rudi Visker points out, "Foucault can only dispute 
the scientific ideal of the human sciences by basing his arguments... on a specific conception of 
what constitutes the scientificity of science: the difference between the position of the human and 
the other sciences (...) is for Foucault an argument-the only argument-which leads to the 
direct conclusion that they are unscientific in character." 57 For Foucault, the human in the 
human sciences is not properly studied by scientific standards. But what about these standards? 
These standards are not compatible with the multiplicity ofknowledges that Foucault reveals for 
they endorse the ability to find an origin, an a priori ahistorical Knowledge ofhow the world 
operates that Foucault emphatically rejects. Along with endorsing a genealogical approach that 
56 Phenomenology Roundtable, p. 1. 
57 Rudi Visker, p. 42. 
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unroots the concept ofRationality and Knowledge in tracing discursive changes and in 
uncovering subjected knowledges, he needs to put forth an alternative to positivism. 
Phenomenology offers this alternative. The notion ofobjectivity from subjectivity 
permits not only a focus on the active subject, but also accounts for the notion ofknowledges. 
This description ofobjectivity allows for many concepts of the world-as-meant, meanings given 
to the world by the subject as well as what the subject knows of the world. The multiplicity spills 
forth. 
As part of this active subject-centered methodological alternative to positivism, the 
phenomenological task does not dismiss notions of the world nor does it stop investigating these 
notions simply because the notions are discursive. As Fryer states, "In its investigation of the 
lifeworld, phenomenology also investigates how experiences, even ones that are more properly 
discursive products than keys to the transcendental, shape our worldview and experiences of the 
world.,,58 While Foucault disrupts notions and points to their discursiveness, he also implicitly 
rejects any meaning beyond the fact of their discursiveness and stops his investigation after 
illuminating their discursiveness. Husserl, however, focuses on the world-as-meant for the 
subject, and in the process, opens up understandings of the world and grounds objective science 
in the life-world. Instead ofa finite task that ends with the revealing ofdiscursiveness, the 
phenomenological method is an infinite task. 
More De-Sedimenting: What Foucault Adds 
Part of the difficult albeit fruitful infinite phenomenological task is the continuous 
reflection that the epoche entails. Husserl calls upon the inquirer to bracket what she knows, to 
58 Fryer, p. 156. 
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reflect upon and question what is known, and to break down finnly rooted knowledges. The 
epoche is difficult to achieve because of the impulse to hold on to positivistic proof in science, in 
history, and the testimony of others-the natural attitude. Natanson points out that "the 
perfonnance ofphenomenology may be described in the natural attitude, but it cannot be grasped 
in that way.,,59 But the epoche is also difficult to achieve if the inquirer does not know about 
what to inquire. How do we know what and to what extent to call into question about ourselves? 
Foucault's analysis offers some suggestions. 
With Foucault's analysis ofpower and social relations, there is a deeper explanation of 
what reflection in the Husserlian epoche involves. In putting forth the notion of subjugated 
knowledges and the description ofpower's role and character, Foucault further reveals and 
destabilizes sedimented knowledges, a destabilization that helps elucidate what to call into 
question about ourselves in the epoche. 
The relational aspect of power shows that social interaction and intersubjectivity entail 
power dynamics: "what is" about the world involves more than tacit agreement. While, in 
Husserlian terms, we both intersubjectively know that the other endows meaning to objects and 
that there may be multiple meanings given to objects, Husserl does not expand on how certain 
meanings take on more significance or more value than others-the hierarchy and ordering of 
meaning, ofhow things become "what is." There are discursive struggles for legitimacy and 
nonnality. With the Foucauldian dynamic ofpower, power as productive and relational, it 
becomes evident that even agreed upon meanings have certain albeit malleable strategies and 
objectives. 
59 Natanson, p. 75. 
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This multiplicity of techniques and plurality of knowledge illustrate that there is a naivete 
in limiting our exploration of what it means to know and to uniquely know something. 
Historically, individually, and collectively, relational power and discursive battles couple and 
recouple what we know, shifts that have become invisible as they discipline us and we discipline 
ourselves to their normality and take their for truth about the world. From subjugated 
knowledges it is apparent that some knowledges are sacrificed at the expense of others. 
Subjugated knowledges point to the need to continually seek different layers of knowledge about 
something: To interrogate what is seemingly natural, normal, or always there. To question what 
is considered more right or more true. 
Rather than operate solely Husserl's transcendental level of intersubjectivity, Foucault 
illustrates the dynamic push-pull in establishing certain meanings over others. With this complex 
push-pull, it is evident that are there more layers to bracket in the epoche. Through Foucauldian 
aspects of power and subjected knowledges, more about what we know is called into question 
and bracketed. Sedimented knowledge becomes unstuck and possibilities open up. 
Husserl with Foucault: A Human-Centered Notion ofEnduring Constitutions 
The subject qua agent gives a new dimension to sociopolitical interactions, knowledges, 
and institutions that Foucault's explanation and Husserl's epoche together expose. The primacy 
of the concrete subject points to how power relations, discourses, and the will to truth come 
through the subject's constitution: as the subject's formation of the wOrld-as-world, the world as 
containing discourses, politics, and truths. Notions of sex and gender as well as gender roles, for 
example, come from the individual constituting the world as having these categories. But the 
world becomes the world through the intersubjective, shared constitution. The world becomes the 
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world-as-world as the subject in a "community ofmonads" lives out structures of thought, builds 
institutions and ideas of the world, and exchanges and shares this information with others. These 
institutions, discourses, and norms are enduring constitutions from the dynamics of sociopolitical 
relations, the effects ofpower relations and the inter-constituting subjective world. Constituting 
in an intersubjective world entails power relations; not a oppressor-oppressed dualism, but power 
based on discursive battles and social interactions. This inter-tangling of power, ideas, 
constitutions, and a plurality of intending consciousness yields a complexity of the world and of 
the subject beyond our wildest imagination. 
From this Husserl-Foucauldian perspective, a focus on the complex active-centered 
subject emerges. Foucault's genealogy grounds individuals in the sociopolitical world, how we 
are concretely in an intersubjective world rather than focusing on how we are supposed to be. 
Husserl points to the primacy of the meaning-endowing transcendental yet concrete ego, not a 
metaphysical or ideal ego. Combining hermeneutic and existential, concrete dimensions ofbeing 
in the world, Foucault's tum to the active subject and Husserl's intended consciousness returns 
the inquirer to the nuclear source ofhislher activity. Husserl grounds the inquiry60 in the primacy 
of the active subject while Foucault explains sociopolitical dynamics at work within this 
subjectivity. Together, there is a recognition of the intersubjective power dynamics at work and 
enduring constitutions that result from this intersubjectivity. But this query also leaves the human 
at the center and stimulates persistent critical inquiry into sedimented layers ofknowledge. 
The desedimenting ofknowledge about the world, a combination of the Husserlian 
epoche and the Foucauldian genealogy ofpower relations and subjugated knowledges, applies to 
anyone wanting answers to understanding the subject and the intersubjective world in which she 
60 Natanson, p.54 
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is enmeshed while realizing that unambiguous answers are not necessarily guaranteed. Husserl 
remarks, "In short, we carry out an epoche in regard to all objective theoretical interests, all aims 
and activities belong to us as objective scientists or even simply as [ordinary] people desirous of 
[this kind of] knowledge.,,61 We inquire because we are interested in what the subject has to say 
about her being in the world and experiencing the world, complete with sociopolitical 
dimensions. 
Our query about the human and her understanding of the world is objectivity from and 
for subjectivity. This recognition of the active subject does not try to universalize experience nor 
give a metaphysical property to the subject; rather, it points to the transcendental constituting ego 
in order to avoid Foucault's impossibility in explaining discursive struggles from a constituted 
ego. The world-as-meant is revealed: how subjects give meaning to the world-as-world and the 
objects in it as well as what meanings they give. These meanin~ may be shared or unique to 
each individual. The focus on de-sedimentation keeps the dynamism of these meanings while 
also pointing to the continuous and infinite task of the inquiry. 
In the continual inquiry, there is also a new tenet: Embrace the ambiguity and live in the 
tension ofthis ambiguity. While there are certain invariant structures in the life-world, there are 
many variances in how or why the subject gives meaning to the world. In the inquiry, there is 
also not a final, ultimate arrival point for the inquiry other than the specific inquiry at a given 
moment. Rather than accepting the world on a straightforward acceptance or habitual manner 
and rather than stopping the inquiry at a discursive level, there is an inquiry into these 
experiences themselves and the manner in which they bestow sense. This move for a recognition 
of a complex, active subject in sociopolitical relations is neither "a skeptical nor a refusal of all 
61 Husserl, Crisis, p. 135. (Translator's [additions]) 
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verified truth,,62 nor does it "deny or relinquish the empirical.,,63 Instead, it demands that 
empirical and verified truth not rely on a "found" world in its approach to the subject. 
Rather than repeating past sociological approaches to social interaction, as well as other 
academic disciplines about the human that rely on the strictly empirical, "found" world that 
undermines the activity ofthe subject, this new approach moves for certain characteristics of 
subjectivity that need to be taken into account in future sociological methods as well as projects 
within, between, and across academic disciplines of the human and about the human.64 It centers 
on the active, meaning-endowing subject: the knower and the knowing are no longer divorced 
and meaning does not remain stagnant or fixed to a certain individual, institution, or group. This 
new way ofunderstanding the subject points to certain attributes of the subject: the intentionality 
ofher consciousness, her constant endowment of meaning to the world, her shared and enduring 
constitutions, her acknowledgement ofothers in the world, and the political push-pull in her 
interactions and bestowment ofmeaning on the world. Simultaneously, this approach to 
understanding the subject is engaged.65 It gets into the grit ofliving, of the subject continually 
endowing and shifting meaning in the midst of a complex world and complex interactions. This 
approach constantly interrogates the notions ofwhat is perceived as "there," as an a priori truth 
or as a positivistic notion, so as not to fall back on the taken-for-granted, sedimented notions of 
the world and of the subject of which Husserl and Foucault both warn us. Husserl and Foucault 
in tandem points to a methodology that has a commitment to a process ofunfolding and of 
62 Foucault, "The Subject and Power," p. 781.
 
63 Natanson, p. 185.
 
64 That is, other regional ontologies, each with their own theme and place (Phenomenology
 
Roundtable 2)
 
65 An engagement rather than an application because application implies also that it can also be
 
not applied or unapplied and hence distant from its connection to its intended-ness.
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becoming rather than pointing to an ultimate, terminating end or an arrival point in the inquiry.66 
With the symbiosis ofHusserI and Foucault arises: 
An action-centered humanism: 
An infinite task 
A constant becoming. 
66 A caution against invoking progress: Progress implies an end to strive for, a destination point, 
an ultimate arrival. Progress in this fashion would re-invoke the positive notion that there is a 
final resting point. In avoiding words such as complete or comprehensive in describing this 
project for an active subject, I hope to avoid the insistence or the possibility of finding an 
ultimate or found truth as well as to avoid making a metaphysical claim on the essence of an 
individual. 
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